The Sheikh Hasina Conundrum: How a Death Sentence is Forcing India to Rethink its Entire Bangladesh Doctrine 

India faces a profound diplomatic and strategic crisis following the conviction and death sentence of Bangladesh’s former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina for crimes against humanity, as her refuge in India creates an intractable bind.

New Delhi’s long-standing, interest-driven alliance with Hasina secured vital stability, connectivity, and a counter to Chinese influence, but her exile now forces India to choose between extraditing a key ally—burning its reputation for loyalty—or sheltering her, thereby alienating Bangladesh’s current interim government and fueling public anti-India sentiment.

This dilemma has triggered a rapid “de-Indianisation” of Bangladeshi foreign policy under Muhammad Yunus, who is reorienting Dhaka towards Beijing and others, threatening the deep economic and security interdependence that defines the relationship and exposing the risks of India’s strategy of betting heavily on a single, ultimately vulnerable, foreign leader.

The Sheikh Hasina Conundrum: How a Death Sentence is Forcing India to Rethink its Entire Bangladesh Doctrine 

For decades, the bedrock of India’s relationship with Bangladesh was seen as unshakeable, built on the blood and sacrifice of the 1971 Liberation War. Today, that foundation is cracking under the weight of a single, profound dilemma: what to do with a condemned former prime minister seeking refuge on its soil. The conviction of Sheikh Hasina for crimes against humanity isn’t just a legal or diplomatic headache for New Delhi; it is a full-scale stress test of India’s strategic priorities, exposing the perils of its deeply entrenched “neighbourhood first” policy and forcing a reckoning with the limits of its influence. 

India’s embrace of Sheikh Hasina was never merely sentimental. It was a cold, hard calculation of national interest that paid immense dividends. During her 15-year rule, Hasina delivered what successive Indian governments craved most: a stable, predictable, and cooperative eastern flank. She acted decisively against anti-India insurgent groups that used Bangladeshi territory as a sanctuary. She deepened economic ties, making Bangladesh India’s largest trading partner in South Asia. Crucially, she tilted towards Delhi in the regional Great Game, providing a crucial bulwark against China’s creeping influence in the Bay of Bengal. 

This alignment, however, came with a mounting political cost. As Hasina consolidated power, her government grew increasingly authoritarian. The space for dissent shrank, and the political opposition was systematically weakened. For India, which publicly champions democracy, the quiet support for an increasingly autocratic ally created a slow-burning credibility crisis with the Bangladeshi public. The dam finally broke in 2024 with the massive, student-led protests. The violent crackdown that followed, leading to hundreds of deaths, proved to be her undoing, forcing her flight to India and paving the way for an interim government under Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus. 

Now, with a death sentence hanging over her from a special tribunal in Dhaka, India finds itself in a bind of its own making. The asylum it likely intended as a temporary, humanitarian gesture for a fallen ally is hardening into a permanent, high-stakes standoff. 

The Unenviable Quartet: India’s Four Bad Options 

As South Asia expert Michael Kugelman outlines, Delhi faces a menu of unpalatable choices, each with significant downsides. 

• Extradition: This is the non-starter. To hand Hasina over would be seen across the Indian political spectrum as an unconscionable betrayal of a trusted friend. It would signal to every other regional ally that India’s support is fickle and conditional, severely damaging its reliability as a partner. “India prides itself on not turning on its friends,” Kugelman notes, and in the cut-throat arena of geopolitics, that reputation is a core asset. 

• Maintain the Status Quo: This is the current, default path, but it grows riskier by the day. Harbouring a fugitive condemned by a neighbouring government is a profound irritant. Once a newly elected government takes charge in Dhaka next year, this stance could freeze diplomatic relations entirely, making cooperation on everything from water sharing to border security nearly impossible. 

• Enforce Her Silence: This option involves pressuring Hasina to refrain from political activity or high-profile interviews while in exile. Yet, this is profoundly difficult to enforce. She remains the leader of her Awami League party, and a political animal is unlikely to go quietly into the night. For a democratic India to be seen forcibly silencing a former leader would also be a terrible optic. 

• Find a Third Country: On the surface, this seems the cleanest solution—pass the problem to a neutral state. In reality, it is fraught with difficulty. As Kugelman puts it, few governments would be willing to accept a “high-maintenance guest with serious legal problems and security needs.” Finding a taker for a figure as polarizing as Hasina is a long shot. 

This gridlock reveals a deeper truth: India’s foreign policy, for all its economic and military heft, possesses limited tools for managing political collapse in a allied nation. It can prop up a leader, but it has no clear playbook for when that leader falls. 

The Anatomy of an Asymmetric Relationship: Why Neither Side Can Walk Away 

The sheer depth of interconnection between India and Bangladesh makes this crisis so acute. This isn’t a simple spat between two nations; it’s a divorce proceeding between deeply enmeshed partners. 

Bangladesh is vital to India’s security architecture. The 4,100-km porous border is a key front in managing terrorism, illegal immigration, and trafficking. For India’s landlocked northeastern states, Bangladesh provides critical transit and connectivity routes, a lifeline that Hasina willingly kept open. 

Economically, the relationship is massively asymmetric yet interdependent. While Bangladesh is India’s largest South Asian trading partner, it runs a significant trade deficit, relying heavily on Indian raw materials, energy, and food exports. India supplies electricity to Bangladesh, has built cross-border rail links, and has offered billions in concessional credit. As Professor Sanjay Bhardwaj of JNU states, “It would be difficult for Bangladesh to function without India’s co-operation.” 

Yet, this very asymmetry has bred resentment. A recent survey showing 75% of Bangladeshis view Beijing positively, compared to just 11% for Delhi, is a stunning indictment of India’s eroded soft power. Many Bangladeshis blame India for propping up Hasina during her most repressive phase, viewing Delhi not as a liberator but as an overbearing patron. 

The Yunus Pivot: The “De-Indianisation” of Bangladeshi Foreign Policy 

The interim government of Muhammad Yunus is moving with remarkable speed to capitalize on this public sentiment and rebalance Bangladesh’s geopolitical stance. Scholars like Bian Sai have termed this a conscious effort at “de-Indianising” foreign policy. 

The signs are everywhere: the cancellation of judicial exchanges with India, the renegotiation of energy deals favourable to Indian companies, the deliberate slowing of India-led connectivity projects, and a very public courtship of Beijing, Islamabad, and even Ankara. The message is clear: the era of automatic alignment with India is over. Bangladesh is now openly hedging its bets, seeking to diversify its partnerships to enhance its own strategic autonomy. 

This is a rational, if painful, recalibration from Dhaka’s perspective. But for Delhi, it represents a significant strategic setback. Losing Bangladesh as a dependable partner directly undermines India’s ability to counter China in the region and manage its own internal security. 

The Path Ahead: Navigating the Turbulence 

So, where does India go from here? The path is not one of bold moves, but of patient, quiet diplomacy. 

As Avinash Paliwal of SOAS University of London argues, “India should not be in a hurry.” The immediate goal must be to engage with all stakeholders in Dhaka—including the powerful armed forces—to prevent a total rupture. The relationship is likely to remain “turbulent” for the next 12-18 months, with its ultimate trajectory depending heavily on the credibility of Bangladesh’s upcoming elections. 

“If the interim government is able to pull off elections with credibility, and an elected government takes charge, it could open options for the two sides to renegotiate the relationship and limit the damage,” Paliwal suggests. 

The deeper, more uncomfortable question India must confront is whether its strategy was flawed from the start. By placing such concentrated bets on a single individual, did Delhi inadvertently undermine the long-term resilience of the relationship? As Paliwal asks, “Why does India face this dilemma in the first place?” 

The answer, from a realpolitik perspective, is simple. As former Indian high commissioner Pinak Ranjan Chakravarty bluntly states, “You deal with whoever is in power, is friendly, and helps you get your job done. Foreign policy isn’t driven by public perception or morality.” 

Yet, the Hasina conundrum proves that while foreign policy may not be driven by morality, it cannot entirely escape the consequences of public perception. The ultimate challenge for India is to forge a relationship with Bangladesh that is resilient enough to withstand the rise and fall of any single leader—a relationship built not on the loyalty of a person, but on the enduring interests of two peoples forever bound by geography and history. The future of the subcontinent depends on it.