The Separation vs. Disarmament Dilemma: Why Turkey’s Gaza Stabilization Plan Sparks a Core Peacekeeping Debate 

The debate over the International Stabilization Force in Gaza centers on a fundamental sequencing dilemma: Turkey, backed by regional allies like Egypt and Qatar, argues the force must first act as a buffer to separate Israeli troops from Hamas, establishing a stable ceasefire and enabling a Palestinian-led administration, with disarmament integrated into a later political process. In stark contrast, Israel insists on the upfront disarmament of Hamas as a non-negotiable precondition for its own withdrawal, viewing anything else as a dangerous pause that allows the group to rearm.

This standoff, fueled by the traumatic legacy of past conflicts and the failed precedent of peacekeeping in Lebanon, leaves potential troop-contributing nations hesitant and risks stalling the mission entirely, revealing that the core issue is not just tactical but philosophical—whether to prioritize immediate, enforceable security or a step-by-step process aimed at creating conditions for a more durable, politically grounded peace.

The Separation vs. Disarmament Dilemma: Why Turkey’s Gaza Stabilization Plan Sparks a Core Peacekeeping Debate 

The proposal for an International Stabilization Force (ISF) in Gaza, authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 2803, represents one of the most ambitious international interventions in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in decades. Yet, as Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s recent intervention at the Doha Forum makes clear, the mission is stalled over a fundamental question: what comes first—separating the warring parties or disarming the militants? This is not a minor procedural dispute but a clash of philosophies that will determine whether the force becomes an agent of durable peace or a guarantor of a fragile, temporary calm. 

Fidan’s argument is that the ISF’s “first objective… should be to separate Palestinians from the Israelis on the border line,” with disarmament of Hamas to follow as part of a later, more comprehensive political process. This “separation-first” model, backed by regional players like Egypt and Qatar, directly challenges the “disarmament-first” imperative held by Israel and central to the U.S.-brokered plan. The outcome of this debate will shape Gaza’s future and test the limits of international peacekeeping in an era of asymmetric warfare. 

A Fragile Ceasefire and the Urgency of Action 

The context for this debate is a strained and violated ceasefire. Since the truce took effect, the asymmetry of the conflict has remained stark: three Israeli soldiers have been killed, compared to over 300 Gazans, according to reports cited by analysts. Both sides accuse the other of daily violations. Norway’s Foreign Minister Espen Barth Eide has warned that the situation is so fragile that the alternatives are to “move forward” or descend “back to war and into total anarchy”. 

Into this volatile environment, the proposed ISF is meant to deploy. However, its mandate under UN Resolution 2803 contains deliberate ambiguities, particularly regarding the timing of an Israeli withdrawal and the definition of a “resurgent terror threat”. This lack of clarity, as Fidan and others note, makes potential troop-contributing nations hesitant. They are urgently seeking answers to practical questions: What are the rules of engagement? Will they be expected to fight Hamas in its tunnels? 

The Competing Roadmaps: Turkey’s Sequence vs. Israel’s Prerequisite 

The core of the diplomatic stalemate is a disagreement over the logical and political sequence of peacebuilding. The following timeline illustrates the starkly different pathways proposed by the opposing sides: 

timeline
   title Competing Pathways for Gaza Stabilization
   section Turkey & Regional Allies’ Plan
     Separation First : ISF deploys as buffer<br>along the “yellow line”
     Local Governance : Palestinian technocratic committee<br>takes over civilian administration
     Security Handover : A new Palestinian police force,<br>independent of Hamas, is trained & deployed
     Political Horizon : Talks advance on Palestinian statehood<br>as part of a final political agreement
     Voluntary Disarmament : Hamas disarms or integrates<br>its weapons into state security forces
   section Israel & U.S. Plan
     Disarmament First : Hamas is disarmed by the ISF,<br>a non-negotiable precondition
     Israeli Withdrawal : IDF withdraws from Gaza only after<br>Hamas’s military capability is neutralized
     Governance & Aid : Transitional administration takes over,<br>reconstruction aid flows
     Political Process : Talks on long-term arrangements proceed
 

Turkey’s “Realistic” Sequence: Stability Before Sovereignty Foreign Minister Fidan’s proposal is grounded in a pragmatic assessment of “realities in the field”. He argues that expecting an international force to immediately disarm a deeply entrenched organization like Hamas is a recipe for mission failure and heavy casualties. Instead, he outlines a multi-step process: 

• Separation and Monitoring: The ISF would deploy along the existing “yellow line” in Gaza, physically separating Israeli forces from Hamas-controlled areas, and act as a monitor to verify ceasefire violations. 

• Civilian Administration: A 15-member Palestinian technocratic committee, agreed upon by Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, would take over Gaza’s daily administration. 

• Local Policing: A new Palestinian police force, explicitly “not Hamas,” would be established to provide public security. 

• Political Horizon: With stability established, the path opens for a political solution. Fidan and others, like Saudi Foreign Minister Dr. Manal bint Hassan Radwan, argue that ultimate security is impossible without a Palestinian state. 

This approach offers Hamas a politically palatable off-ramp. Gulf states and Turkey have suggested Hamas disarm by handing weapons to the Palestinian Authority, not directly to the ISF, framing it as a national integration rather than a surrender. 

Israel’s Security Imperative: Disarmament as a Non-Negotiable Precondition Israel’s position is unequivocal: it will not withdraw from Gaza until Hamas is disarmed. The trauma of the October 7 attacks has cemented this demand as a non-negotiable security requirement. From Israel’s perspective, deploying an international force before disarmament merely freezes the conflict in a state advantageous to Hamas, allowing it to regroup and rearm, much like Hezbollah did in Lebanon after 2006. Israeli officials view the ISF’s primary purpose as completing the military objective they pursued for two years: dismantling Hamas’s military infrastructure. Any sequencing that delays this task is seen as a fundamental betrayal of the plan’s goal to ensure Gaza can never again threaten Israel. 

Hamas’s Calculated Ambiguity Hamas, for its part, engages in strategic ambiguity. Senior officials like Khalil al-Hayya state they will only surrender arms to “the authority of a sovereign and independent Palestinian state”. Another official, Bassem Naim, has suggested a willingness to discuss “freezing or storing” weapons during a long-term truce. This positions disarmament not as a security concession but as the final act of sovereign statehood—a sequencing that places it at the very end of the political process, not the beginning. 

The Ghost of Peacekeeping Past: Lessons from Lebanon and Beyond 

The debate is haunted by the precedent of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Deployed after the 2006 war to separate Israel and Hezbollah, UNIFIL’s weak mandate and inability to prevent Hezbollah’s massive rearmament is widely seen as a key factor that made the devastating 2023 conflict inevitable. This history informs the perspectives of both sides: 

• For Turkey and skeptics: UNIFIL is a cautionary tale against dispatching a passive “buffer” force without the mandate or will to confront a determined non-state actor. It demonstrates that separation without disarmament is a temporary fix. 

• For Israel and advocates of a strong mandate: UNIFIL proves that an international force that shies away from enforcement becomes complicit in the next war. It validates the demand for a robust “stabilization” force, not a classical “peacekeeping” one. 

The distinction is critical. Classical peacekeeping monitors lines between state armies. Stabilization operations are more ambitious, aiming to build state architecture and actively confront militias in stateless areas—a far more dangerous and complex mission. 

quadrantChart
   title Spectrum of International Force Mandates in Conflict Zones
   x-axis “Low Ambition / Risk” –> “High Ambition / Risk”
   y-axis “Passive Observer Role” –> “Active Enforcement Role”
   “UNTSO (Israel, 1948)”: [0.1, 0.2]
   “UNFICYP (Cyprus, 1964)”: [0.3, 0.4]
   “UNIFIL (Lebanon, Post-2006)”: [0.5, 0.5]
   “Proposed ISF ‘Separation’ Model”: [0.6, 0.7]
   “NATO in Kosovo (1999)”: [0.9, 0.9]
   “Proposed ISF ‘Disarmament’ Model”: [0.85, 0.85]
 

The Geopolitical Chess Game: Who Will Send Troops? 

The sequencing debate directly impacts the coalition of the willing. Countries will not risk their soldiers for a mission they deem flawed or impossible. 

• The Regional Reluctance: Key Arab states like Jordan, Egypt, and the UAE have signaled they will not contribute troops to a force whose mission includes fighting Palestinians inside Gaza. They are sensitive to being seen as doing Israel’s bidding. 

• The Muslim-Majority Contingent: Indonesia and Azerbaijan have expressed willingness to contribute. However, Fidan hinted they would prefer Turkey, a major Muslim power, to also be involved for regional legitimacy. Israel is reportedly seeking to veto Turkish participation, creating another point of contention. 

• The Operational Reality: As analyst Rob Geist Pinfold notes, distant contributors like Azerbaijan and Indonesia have little incentive to accept high casualties for a conflict with few direct ramifications for their national security. Their tolerance for risk will be low, pushing the mission toward a more passive, observational role—precisely the model Turkey proposes and Israel fears. 

Beyond the Force: The Political Horizon and Gaza’s Suffering 

Underlying the military sequencing is the unresolved political question. The Trump plan and UN resolution are notably vague on a political horizon, merely calling for a “dialogue” on peaceful coexistence. As the PCPSR policy brief argues, without a clear, credible pathway to a sovereign Palestinian state, the entire architecture lacks legitimacy for Palestinians. Hamas can publicly justify retaining weapons as the legitimate right of a people under occupation, a narrative that resonates on Gaza’s devastated streets. 

This political vacuum has dire humanitarian consequences. Reconstruction, estimated at $70 billion, cannot begin in earnest without a stable political and security framework. Furthermore, the current plan’s aid provision—funneling assistance primarily to “terror-free areas” handed to the ISF—risks creating a two-tier Gaza, where most civilians remain in destitution. Qatar has explicitly stated it will not again bear sole responsibility for rebuilding Gaza, arguing that only broad international ownership can deter future destruction. 

Conclusion: A Choice Between Process and Precondition 

The standoff over the Gaza stabilization force is a microcosm of the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It pits a process-oriented, incremental approach favored by regional actors against a security-first, precondition-based approach demanded by Israel. 

Turkey’s call to prioritize separation is a bet on creating facts of stability that can build trust and enable harder political compromises later, including on disarmament. It acknowledges the near-impossibility of forcing disarmament on a group that remains a potent social and political force in Gaza without first offering a credible political alternative. 

Israel’s insistence on upfront disarmament is a reflection of profound trauma and a strategic judgment that only the complete removal of Hamas’s military threat can provide security. It views the Turkish sequence as a return to the failed paradigms of the past. 

The international community now faces a choice. It can push for a forced disarmament mission that may lack willing troops and trigger immediate conflict, or it can back a separation mission that risks entrenching a tense status quo. Ultimately, as the lessons of Lebanon show, no international force, however sequenced, can succeed without the one ingredient currently in shortest supply: a unified political will to address the root causes of the conflict, not just its violent symptoms. The sequencing of the ISF’s tasks will not just define its mission—it will reveal what the world believes is possible in Gaza.