The Pakistani Gambit: Can Its Troops Stabilize Gaza Without Igniting a Political Firestorm at Home? 

Pakistan faces a complex dilemma as it considers joining the International Stabilisation Force in Gaza, balancing its strategic and economic interests against profound domestic political risks. While the country’s leadership is inclined to participate to cement its geopolitical relevance, secure vital economic support from the US and Gulf allies, and leverage its extensive UN peacekeeping experience, the decision is fraught with peril due to the Pakistani public’s deep-seated support for Palestine and the non-negotiable red line of any operational coordination with Israel, which could ignite a severe domestic backlash and erode the government’s credibility.

The Pakistani Gambit: Can Its Troops Stabilize Gaza Without Igniting a Political Firestorm at Home? 

The recent UN Security Council resolution endorsing an International Stabilisation Force (ISF) for Gaza has placed Pakistan in a geopolitical crucible. As the presiding member of the council, Pakistan voted “yes,” but its ambassador’s statement was laced with reservations, perfectly capturing the nation’s precarious balancing act. Now, as the world looks towards the formation of the ISF, a critical question emerges: Can Pakistan, with its powerful military and deep-seated ideological principles, deploy troops to Gaza without facing a devastating political backlash? 

The answer is not a simple yes or no, but a complex equation involving economic desperation, strategic alliances, and the fierce, unyielding sentiment of the Pakistani public. 

A Tightrope Walk at the Highest Level 

Pakistan’s endorsement of the US-authored resolution was a masterclass in diplomatic ambiguity. By publicly supporting the motion while simultaneously warning that “some critical suggestions” were ignored, Islamabad sent a clear message: it is willing to play the game, but on its own terms, and with its eyes wide open. 

This caution stems from the plan’s inherent vagueness. The resolution promises a “credible pathway” to Palestinian statehood but provides no map. It proposes a Board of Peace and an ISF but leaves their mandates and powers dangerously undefined. For a country where the Palestinian cause is a cornerstone of foreign policy, stepping into this legal and operational fog is fraught with risk. 

“The US playbook is clear and has a pro-Israel tilt. Yet, we need to recognise that this is the best option that we have,” asserts Salman Bashir, a former Pakistani foreign secretary. This sentiment reflects the pragmatic, if uncomfortable, reality in Islamabad’s power corridors. After the immense destruction in Gaza, the prevailing view among the elite is that an imperfect international intervention is preferable to a return to the status quo. 

The Allure of Geopolitical Relevance and Economic Salvation 

Pakistan’s sudden centrality in this Middle Eastern drama is no accident. It is the culmination of a calculated diplomatic and military offensive. Several factors have converged to boost Islamabad’s stock: 

• The “Favorite Field Marshal”: Army Chief General Asim Munir’s unprecedented access to the Trump White House signals a dramatic rehabilitation of the US-Pakistan military relationship. This personal rapport is a valuable currency, translating into geopolitical influence. 

• The Saudi Shield: The Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA) with Saudi Arabia is a game-changer. It formalizes Pakistan’s role as a key security guarantor for the Gulf, making its participation in any regional force almost expected by its richest benefactor. 

• The Nuclear-Arbiter: As the only Muslim-majority nuclear power, Pakistan brings a unique weight to the table. Its involvement lends the ISF a level of Islamic legitimacy that would be hard to assemble otherwise. 

Underpinning all of this is Pakistan’s dire economic situation. The government is actively courting foreign investment, showcased by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and General Munir’s joint pitch for Pakistan’s rare earth minerals to Trump. Participation in the ISF is not just a military decision; it is a potential down payment on future economic goodwill from the US and Gulf allies. As analyst Kamran Bokhari notes, Pakistan’s economic woes mean it may “need to reciprocate militarily in order to secure” this crucial support. 

The Domestic Third Rail: Palestine and the “Israeli Factor” 

Despite the strategic incentives, the domestic landscape is a minefield. The government’s careful rhetoric stands in stark contrast to the raw, emotional power of the Palestinian issue on the Pakistani street. 

The most significant red line is any form of recognition or coordination with Israel. Pakistan’s passports explicitly forbid travel to Israel, and the country has maintained a principled non-recognition stance since its founding. The idea of Pakistani soldiers operating in a theatre where coordination with the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) is even a remote possibility is politically toxic. 

This is the core of the dilemma. As reported, the US has already established a Civil-Military Coordination Center (CMCC) on Israeli territory. Operational logic dictates that the ISF will have to interface with this center, and by extension, with Israeli authorities. 

Retired General Muhammad Saeed suggests a workaround: “There are other countries potentially part of ISF who have relations with Israel. It is likely they will take the commanding role… and thus they will be the ones to engage with them, and not Pakistan.” This “plausible deniability” may be the government’s hoped-for solution, but it is a fragile one. 

Omar Mahmood Hayat, another retired general, issues a stark warning against such maneuvering: “Any operational tie to Israel will ignite domestic backlash and erode public trust… This is not just a moral dilemma, but a strategic contradiction. It weakens our diplomatic posture.” The opposition, led by figures like Imran Khan, would seize on any perceived compromise to unleash a firestorm of criticism against the already vulnerable government. 

The Mechanics of Deployment: Experience vs. Ambiguity 

Should Pakistan decide to take the plunge, it is not starting from scratch. It is one of the world’s largest and most experienced contributors to UN peacekeeping, with over 2,600 personnel currently deployed in various conflict zones. This expertise in operating under complex mandates in volatile environments is a key asset. 

However, the ISF is not a traditional UN peacekeeping mission. The UNSC resolution calls for the “demilitarisation” of Gaza and the “permanent decommissioning of weapons from non-state armed groups”—a mandate that Hamas has already rejected. This moves the mission from peacekeeping towards potential peace enforcement, a far more dangerous proposition. 

Retired General Saeed believes the troop commitment would be manageable from a purely military standpoint, likely not requiring a drawdown from Pakistan’s sensitive borders with India and Afghanistan. The real challenge is the unclear Rules of Engagement (RoE). Will Pakistani troops be tasked solely with protecting aid and maintaining ceasefires, or could they be drawn into disarmament operations against Palestinian factions? The government has promised to consult parliament, suggesting it understands that such a decision cannot be made behind closed doors. 

The Path Forward: A Decision of Existential Proportions 

Pakistan finds itself at a historic crossroads. The choice is not merely about sending troops abroad; it is a decision that will redefine its identity on the world stage. 

On one hand, participation offers a chance to cement its role as a indispensable regional security actor, unlock vital economic partnerships, and play a direct part in shaping Gaza’s fragile future. It is a path of realpolitik, arguing that influence is earned through difficult compromises. 

On the other hand, abstaining safeguards the nation’s ideological purity, protects the government from potentially explosive domestic unrest, and maintains a clear, principled stance against any normalisation with Israel until a sovereign Palestinian state is achieved. 

The government’s current strategy of calculated delay is its only safe option. It is waiting for the “much-needed clarity” its UN ambassador demanded. It needs to see the ISF’s final structure, its command chain, and the precise wording of its mandate. Only then can it attempt to craft a narrative for its public—one that emphasizes humanitarian duty, Islamic solidarity, and a strict operational firewall against Israel. 

Ultimately, Pakistan’s Gaza dilemma is a microcosm of the challenges facing middle powers in a fractured world: how to navigate between principle and pragmatism, between the demands of powerful allies and the will of its own people. The tightrope has been walked at the UN; the far more difficult part is now bringing that balance home.