The Delicate Dance: How India Masters the Art of Balancing Israel, Palestine, and Iran 

India has masterfully developed a “de-hyphenated” foreign policy in West Asia, allowing it to simultaneously deepen strategic ties with mutually adversarial powers—Israel, Palestine, and Iran—by decoupling each relationship from the others and pursuing them based on their own distinct merits. This approach enables New Delhi to maximize its national interests by securing advanced defence technology and counter-terrorism cooperation from Israel, maintaining developmental commitments and diplomatic support for Palestinian statehood, and preserving geostrategic access to Iran through critical projects like the Chabahar Port, all while managing domestic sentiment from its large Muslim population and protecting the welfare of millions of Indian expatriates in the Gulf. However, the ultimate test of this balancing act will be its sustainability amid intensifying regional conflicts, as it remains to be seen whether India can preserve its strategic autonomy and maneuverability when forced to choose between its diverse partners in a crisis.

The Delicate Dance: How India Masters the Art of Balancing Israel, Palestine, and Iran 

When Air India One touched down at Ben Gurion Airport last week, the red carpet rolled out for Narendra Modi marked more than just another diplomatic visit. It symbolized the culmination of a strategic evolution nearly eight decades in the making—one that has transformed India from a conflicted observer of West Asian politics into a sophisticated practitioner of what diplomats now call “de-hyphenated engagement.” 

The image of Modi embracing Benjamin Netanyahu, their clasped hands and warm smiles beamed across global media, told only part of the story. Behind the carefully curated optics lies a foreign policy apparatus that has learned to walk an impossibly narrow tightrope—simultaneously deepening defence ties with Israel, maintaining developmental commitments to Palestine, and preserving strategic access to Iran, all while nearly 9 million Indian citizens live and work in the Gulf region. 

The Evolution from Hyphenation to De-Hyphenation 

To understand where India stands today, one must first understand where it came from. For decades after independence, India’s West Asia policy operated under what foreign policy analysts called “hyphenation”—the belief that closer ties with Israel would automatically damage relations with Arab nations and Palestine. This perspective, rooted in India’s own anti-colonial struggle and solidarity with the Palestinian cause, meant that for over forty years, New Delhi maintained only consular-level relations with Israel while championing Palestinian statehood at every international forum. 

The transformation didn’t happen overnight. It began quietly in 1992, when India established full diplomatic relations with Israel, and accelerated through successive governments of different political hues. But the real shift occurred when policymakers recognized that the region itself was changing. The Arab world was no longer monolithic in its opposition to Israel. Egypt had made peace in 1979, Jordan in 1994, and by 2020, the Abraham Accords saw the UAE and Bahrain normalizing ties with Tel Aviv. 

“If the Arab states themselves are rethinking their positions, why should India remain bound by a rigid framework that no longer reflects regional realities?” asked a senior Indian diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity. “We realized that hyphenation was limiting our options. De-hyphenation opened them.” 

The Israel Calculus: Beyond Weapons Procurement 

Modi’s February 2026 visit, his second as Prime Minister, came at a moment of acute regional tension. War clouds hover over West Asia, US-Iran tensions simmer beneath every diplomatic exchange, and the Gaza Strip remains a scar on the regional landscape. Yet the visit proceeded with the kind of ceremonial warmth usually reserved for closest allies. 

The agreements signed—more than a dozen spanning defence, technology, artificial intelligence, and space cooperation—represent the maturation of a relationship that began in urgency nearly three decades ago. During the 1999 Kargil War, when India found itself internationally isolated following its nuclear tests, Israel emerged as an unlikely lifeline. Despite global pressure, Israeli shipments of precision-guided munitions, mortars, and unmanned aerial vehicles reached Indian forces mid-conflict, providing capabilities that proved decisive in evicting Pakistani intruders from the icy heights of Kashmir. 

“That moment built trust that no amount of peacetime diplomacy could have achieved,” explained retired Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar, former director of the United Nations’ military division. “When your back is against the wall and someone steps up without hesitation, you don’t forget that.” 

Today, India is the largest buyer of Israeli weapons, and Israel ranks as India’s third-largest arms supplier. But the relationship has transcended the transactional. Joint research and development programs now focus on next-generation technologies—AI-enabled targeting systems, cybersecurity protocols, precision agriculture, and space applications. Israeli systems integrate seamlessly with India’s diverse military inventory, creating interoperability that would have seemed unimaginable two decades ago. 

The operational impact of this cooperation became visible during last year’s Operation Sindoor, India’s retaliatory strikes following the Pahalgam terror attack in Jammu and Kashmir. Israeli-origin Harop and Harpy loitering munitions, Heron UAVs, and Barak-8 surface-to-air missile systems featured prominently in operations that targeted terrorist infrastructure deep inside Pakistani territory. 

“Israel’s willingness to share sensitive technologies addresses a critical gap,” noted Dr. Happymon Jacob, professor of diplomacy and disarmament at Jawaharlal Nehru University. “Western partners often place restrictions on how their weapons can be used. Israel understands India’s security challenges intuitively because they face similar threats.” 

The Palestinian Constant: Principles and Pragmatism 

Yet even as Modi proclaimed in Jerusalem that “India stands with Israel firmly, with full conviction,” New Delhi’s actions tell a more nuanced story. Just weeks before the Prime Minister’s departure, India’s Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri announced that New Delhi was implementing development projects worth nearly $170 million for Palestine. In January, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar met with his Palestinian counterpart on the sidelines of the India-Arab Foreign Ministers’ Meeting hosted in New Delhi. 

When the United Nations General Assembly voted in September 2025 on a resolution endorsing peaceful settlement of the Palestine issue and implementation of a two-state solution, India was among the 142 nations voting in favor. The resolution passed overwhelmingly, with only eight countries opposing and seven abstaining. 

This balancing act reflects India’s unique domestic reality. As home to the world’s third-largest Muslim population—exceeding 200 million citizens—New Delhi cannot appear indifferent to Palestinian concerns. The expatriate Indian community in the Gulf, numbering over 9 million, sends billions in remittances annually and represents a vital economic and cultural bridge. 

“Domestic constituency matters in foreign policy, even in a country as large and diverse as India,” observed C. Raja Mohan, a prominent foreign policy analyst. “The difference is that India no longer allows domestic sentiment to dictate foreign policy choices. It acknowledges the sentiment, respects it, and then pursues national interests alongside it.” 

The Palestinian cause itself has evolved. Several Western nations, including the United Kingdom and France, recognized the State of Palestine in 2025, removing some of the stigma previously attached to such positions. Meanwhile, Israel’s military operations in Gaza and expanding West Bank settlements have attracted international criticism, shifting global public opinion toward greater sympathy for Palestinian reconstruction efforts. 

The Iran Imperative: Geostrategy Over Ideology 

Perhaps nowhere is India’s de-hyphenation policy tested more severely than in its relationship with Iran. The two civilizations share historical and linguistic ties stretching back millennia. Persian served as the court language of the Mughal Empire. Trade routes connected the subcontinent to the Persian Gulf for centuries before modern nation-states drew artificial boundaries. 

Yet today, Iran and Israel exist in a state of active hostility, exchanging strikes and threats with alarming frequency. When Israel struck Iranian targets in June 2025, India found itself navigating treacherous diplomatic waters. An initial attempt to distance itself from a strongly-worded Shanghai Cooperation Organization statement condemning Israeli action gave way, months later, to signing a joint declaration in Tianjin that criticized “coordinated US-Israeli aggression” against Iran. 

The apparent inconsistency masks a consistent strategic calculus. Iran offers India something no other nation can provide: physical access to Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Russia that bypasses Pakistan. The Chabahar Port, developed by India on the Gulf of Oman, represents New Delhi’s answer to China’s Gwadar Port, located just 60 miles away as part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. 

“Chabahar is not just about trade,” explained a former Indian ambassador to Tehran. “It’s about strategic access. It’s about connectivity to Afghanistan without going through Pakistan. It’s about the International North-South Transport Corridor that can link Mumbai to Moscow via Iranian railways. These are existential strategic interests.” 

Iran also matters for energy security. Before 2008, Iran was a key crude oil supplier to India, offering favorable credit terms and the option to trade in national currencies rather than dollars. While that relationship diminished following India’s civil nuclear deal with the United States and subsequent sanctions pressure, the underlying logic of energy cooperation remains. Iran sits atop the world’s second-largest natural gas reserves and fourth-largest oil reserves. 

Even on the Kashmir issue, Tehran has historically adopted positions more nuanced than many Islamic nations. In 1994, Iranian diplomats played a critical role in blocking a Pakistani-backed Organization of Islamic Cooperation resolution condemning India for human rights violations in Kashmir—a resolution that would have proceeded to the UN Security Council if passed. While Tehran’s position has hardened somewhat in recent years, particularly after India’s 2019 reorganization of Jammu and Kashmir’s special status, the relationship retains sufficient resilience to weather disagreements. 

The Human Dimension: Where Policy Meets People 

Behind the strategic calculations and diplomatic maneuvering lie human realities that rarely feature in policy papers or joint communiqués. In the cramped lanes of Mumbai’s Mohammad Ali Road, conversations about West Asia carry personal weight. Families trace connections to Dubai, Doha, and Riyadh through sons and daughters working in Gulf cities. Remittances pay for weddings, school fees, and medical treatments. 

“When my son calls from Dubai and says tensions are high, we worry,” admitted Abdul Rashid Khan, a retired schoolteacher whose son works as an engineer in the UAE. “We follow the news differently now. Every statement from Delhi, every visit by the Prime Minister—we watch because it affects our family.” 

These personal connections create constituencies for peace and stability that transcend official policy. Indian workers in Israel—estimated at nearly 20,000, primarily in caregiving and construction—represent another human bridge between the countries. Their remittances, like those from the Gulf, contribute to local economies across Kerala, Punjab, and Uttar Pradesh. 

The diaspora factor works both ways. Indian-origin communities in Gulf countries, some tracing their presence back centuries, have integrated while maintaining cultural connections to the subcontinent. Their success and security depend on stable India-Gulf relations, creating natural pressure on New Delhi to avoid provocative positions that could trigger backlash. 

The Sustainability Question 

As Modi’s visit recedes into diplomatic history and attention shifts to the next crisis, the question haunting Indian strategists is sustainability. Can de-hyphenation survive intensifying regional conflict? What happens if war erupts between Israel and Iran? How does India respond if the Gaza situation deteriorates further? 

“This policy works beautifully in peacetime,” acknowledged a senior official in India’s Ministry of External Affairs. “The challenge comes when you’re forced to choose. If push comes to shove, you cannot be equally close to both sides in a conflict.” 

India’s experience with the Russia-Ukraine war offers some guidance. New Delhi has maintained economic and diplomatic engagement with Moscow while deepening strategic partnership with Washington, buying discounted Russian oil even as Western sanctions multiply. Critics call this hypocrisy; proponents call it strategic autonomy in action. 

The same logic applies in West Asia. India benefits from Israeli technology and Iranian geography, from Palestinian goodwill and Gulf investment capital. Each relationship serves different purposes, addresses different needs, and contributes to different aspects of India’s comprehensive national power. 

Whether this balancing act can survive the region’s centrifugal forces depends partly on factors beyond India’s control. The succession crisis following Iran’s Supreme Leader assassination, the trajectory of US-Iran tensions, the evolution of Israeli domestic politics, and the fate of Gaza reconstruction all carry implications for New Delhi’s maneuverability. 

Yet those who have watched India’s West Asia policy evolve over decades express cautious optimism. “We’ve learned that rigid positions serve no one,” said the retired ambassador. “The region itself is fluid. Alliances shift. Threats mutate. Opportunities emerge unexpectedly. A policy that locks you into permanent friendship or permanent hostility with any actor is a policy destined for failure.” 

The Modi Difference 

Observers note that Modi has brought personal chemistry to international relations in ways that transcend traditional diplomatic channels. His rapport with Netanyahu, visible during the 2026 visit and the 2017 trip before it, creates space for candid conversations that official communications cannot replicate. The two leaders invoke shared history, common threats, and mutual aspirations in ways that resonate with domestic audiences in both countries. 

Yet the policy predates Modi and will likely survive him. The 1992 decision to establish relations came under a Congress government led by P.V. Narasimha Rao. The 1999 Kargil cooperation occurred under Atal Bihari Vajpayee. The Chabahar agreement was signed during Manmohan Singh’s tenure. Different prime ministers, different parties, different ideological orientations—yet the trajectory toward deeper engagement with all West Asian actors has remained remarkably consistent. 

This suggests that de-hyphenation reflects not partisan preference but national consensus. India’s rise as a global power, its growing economic weight, its expanding strategic footprint, and its vulnerability to regional instability all demand a foreign policy that maximizes options rather than foreclosing them. 

Looking Ahead 

As Modi departed Jerusalem and Air India One climbed into the Mediterranean sky, the diplomatic machinery returned to its permanent work: managing contradictions, balancing interests, and preserving relationships. The Prime Minister’s next engagement might involve Palestinian officials in Ramallah or Iranian counterparts in Tehran. The optics would differ, the rhetoric would adjust, but the underlying logic would remain consistent. 

India seeks peace in West Asia because instability there affects Indian lives and Indian interests. It seeks partnerships with all regional actors because each offers capabilities and access that serve Indian objectives. It avoids rigid alignment because alignment limits options and options are the currency of foreign policy. 

Whether this approach proves sustainable amid intensifying regional rivalries will test Indian diplomacy in the years ahead. But for now, New Delhi has mastered a difficult art: engaging mutually adversarial powers simultaneously, upholding diverse national interests, and preserving maneuverability in a region where maneuverability grows scarcer by the day. 

The dance continues, delicate as ever, on a stage where one misstep could prove costly. India, for the moment, moves with confidence—aware that in West Asia, standing still is not an option.