The Criminal Politician’s Playbook: Why Jobs Trump Roads in the Calculus of Power 

Based on research from West Bengal, politicians with criminal records are elected not despite their criminality, but because they strategically leverage welfare programs to build voter support; they deliberately distort the implementation of India’s employment guarantee scheme (MNREGA) by prioritizing short-term, visible benefits—significantly increasing wages and jobs for constituents—at the direct cost of long-term public goods, as evidenced by a drastic reduction in completed infrastructure projects, thereby creating a clientelist system where voters rationally exchange votes for immediate private gains despite the overall detrimental effect on economic efficiency and development.

The Criminal Politician’s Playbook: Why Jobs Trump Roads in the Calculus of Power 

Meta Description: Why do voters elect politicians with criminal records? New research from West Bengal reveals a strategic trade-off: criminal MLAs deliver more short-term jobs but cripple long-term infrastructure, creating a vicious cycle of clientelism that weakens democracy. 

The ballot box presents a paradox in democracies across the world, from India to Italy, Brazil to Nigeria. Faced with a choice between a candidate with a clean record and one accused of serious crimes, a significant portion of the electorate consistently chooses the latter. It’s a phenomenon that baffles reformers and idealists: why would voters willingly “throw the rascals in”? 

The conventional wisdom is that this is a failure of the system—a result of ignorant voters, blinding ethnic loyalties, or outright vote-buying. But what if this choice isn’t a failure of logic, but a cold, calculated decision? What if voters, particularly the most vulnerable, are making a rational choice for their immediate survival, even if it comes at a devastating long-term cost? 

Groundbreaking research focusing on India’s Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MNREGA) in West Bengal provides a compelling answer. It reveals that politicians with criminal records aren’t just winning despite their reputations; they are winning because of a shrewd, targeted strategy that trades public goods for private benefits. They aren’t just breaking the system; they are mastering its weaknesses to build powerful clientelist networks. 

The Pervasive Puzzle of Criminality in Office 

The data is startling. In West Bengal’s 2021 state elections, 49% of winning candidates had criminal cases against them, a sharp rise from 34% in 2011. A majority of these cases weren’t minor offenses; they included charges like murder, kidnapping, and rape. This isn’t an anomaly but a trend observed in many democracies, leading to well-documented negative effects: reduced economic growth, weaker institutions, and a erosion of public trust (Prakash et al., 2019). 

The question, therefore, is not if criminal politicians are harmful, but why they are so successful. The research by Abhinav Khemka moves beyond theories of information asymmetry or identity politics. It tests a provocative hypothesis: perhaps these politicians are perceived as more effective in delivering the specific, targeted benefits that voters desperately need and can immediately feel. 

MNREGA: The Perfect Testing Ground 

To test this, the study zeroes in on India’s largest anti-poverty programme, MNREGA. The scheme is uniquely designed with a dual purpose: 

• Right to Work: It guarantees 100 days of wage employment per year to rural households, providing a crucial social safety net. 

• Public Goods Creation: It aims to create durable community assets like roads, irrigation canals, and water conservation structures. 

This creates a natural tension: the funds can be allocated either to pay more wages (direct, immediate private benefit) or to complete more infrastructure projects (indirect, long-term public benefit). How a politician chooses to leverage this programme reveals their priorities and their strategy for building political capital. 

Using a rigorous Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD), the study compares constituencies where a criminal politician won by a razor-thin margin to those where they barely lost. This method effectively holds constant all other factors—voter demographics, local issues, party machinery—and isolates the impact of the candidate’s criminality itself. 

The Strategic Trade-Off: Wages Over Works 

The findings are striking and reveal a clear, strategic distortion: 

• The Infrastructure Collapse: Constituencies that elected a criminal politician saw a 68% decrease in the number of MNREGA projects completed. This means fewer new roads, fewer repaired canals, and less long-term asset creation for the community. The development engine was stalling. 

• The Jobs Boom: In stark contrast, these very same constituencies experienced a 36% increase in person-days of employment generated. More individuals got more days of work, translating directly into higher household income. The welfare engine was firing on all cylinders. 

This isn’t a minor adjustment; it’s a fundamental re-prioritization. Criminal politicians are consciously shifting resources from the community’s future (infrastructure) to the voter’s present (wages). The study calculates that the extra funds spent on wages could have completed 113 to 348 additional projects annually per constituency—a massive loss in overall efficiency and long-term development. 

Why Target Wages? The Logic of Clientelism 

This seems counterintuitive. Conventional wisdom suggests that corrupt politicians would gravitate toward the “material” component of spending (cement, bricks, equipment) where kickbacks and skimming are easier to hide. So why focus on wages, which are paid directly to workers and are harder to siphon? 

The answer lies in the visibility and credit-claiming nature of wage payments. As studies like Olken (2007) have shown, voters often have limited interest in or awareness of corruption in public goods. A stolen bag of cement is an abstract loss. But a paid workday is a tangible gain. 

For a poor household, a guaranteed job is an immediate lifeline. The politician who can deliver these jobs is not an abstract benefactor; they are a direct patron. This creates a powerful clientelist relationship: “I provide you with work and income; you provide me with your vote.” This relationship is reinforced with each paycheck, building a reliable vote bank based on direct reciprocity. 

Criminal politicians, often with greater access to illicit wealth and a reputation for “getting things done” (by any means necessary), are exceptionally well-positioned to exploit this. They can leverage their muscle and money to control local administration and ensure their constituents are first in line for work, perfectly aligning their operational strengths with voter priorities. 

Is This Just Corruption in Disguise? 

A critical question arises: are these politicians simply inventing “ghost workers” to inflate the wage bill and pocket the money? The research finds no evidence for this. The average wage paid per day and the material cost per project remained consistent across criminal and clean constituencies. 

The higher wage bill is a result of genuinely employing more people. This is not classic embezzlement; it is a more sophisticated form of political investment. The currency isn’t cash in a briefcase; it’s loyalty secured through targeted benefits. 

The Vicious Cycle and the Policy Challenge 

This research bridges a gap between two competing narratives. On one side, ethnographic work (like Vaishnav’s When Crime Pays) argues criminal politicians are seen as effective fixers. On the other, econometric studies show they harm economic growth. This study shows both can be true simultaneously. 

Voters aren’t irrational or ignorant. They are making a rational choice within a broken system. When state institutions are weak and long-term development is unreliable, securing short-term private benefits becomes the most logical survival strategy. The problem is that this choice reinforces the very system that weakens the state. 

This creates a devastating vicious cycle: 

• Weak institutions create a demand for strongmen who can deliver benefits. 

• Criminal politicians get elected and further weaken institutions by prioritizing clientelism over public goods. 

• The erosion of public goods (like roads, schools, water systems) makes voters even more dependent on short-term handouts. 

• The cycle continues, entrenching criminality in politics. 

The policy challenge is monumental. Reforms aimed at strengthening institutions—transparency, bureaucratic efficiency, independent monitoring—are precisely what these elected officials have no incentive to implement. Their power depends on the system’s weakness. 

The solution, therefore, must be external and relentless. It requires: 

• Empowering Local Auditing Systems: Making MNREGA implementation data real-time and easily accessible to civil society groups. 

• Strengthening Election Laws: Strictly enforcing laws that mandate the disclosure of criminal cases and barring convicted individuals from running for office. 

• Investing in Voter Awareness: Not just about who is criminal, but about the long-term economic cost their constituency is paying for those short-term jobs. 

The election of criminal politicians is not a simple failure of morality; it is a failure of the system to offer a better alternative. Until the state can reliably deliver both justice and jobs, the criminal politician’s playbook will remain a winning strategy, and the paradox of the ballot box will continue to haunt democracy. 

References & Further Reading: The analysis above is based on the work of Abhinav Khemka (2024) and synthesizes insights from the broader literature on criminality in politics, including: 

• Vaishnav, M. (2017). When Crime Pays: Money and Muscle in Indian Politics. 

• Prakash, N., et al. (2019). “Do criminally accused politicians affect economic outcomes? Evidence from India.” 

• Olken, B. A. (2007). “Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia.” 

• Banerjee, A. & Pande, R. (2007). ‘Parochial Politics: Ethnic Preferences and Politician Corruption’.