Precedent and Digital Power: How the Karnataka High Court’s X Corp Ruling Challenges India’s Free Speech Framework 

The Karnataka High Court’s September 2025 ruling in the X Corp v. Union of India case, which upheld the government’s use of the Sahyog Portal to issue takedown orders, represents a significant and troubling departure from the Supreme Court’s landmark Shreya Singhal precedent, effectively creating a parallel, less accountable censorship system that privileges state restriction over constitutional free speech protections.

By endorsing a mechanism under Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act that allows numerous law enforcement agencies to remove online content without the procedural safeguards—such as reasoned orders, committee review, and user hearings—explicitly mandated by the Supreme Court for content blocking under Section 69A, the High Court’s order is seen as a act of judicial indiscipline that dilutes binding precedent.

This ruling not only misapplies subsequent Supreme Court judgments to create an artificial sense of legal shift but also risks a profound chilling effect on digital expression in India, making an appeal to the Supreme Court inevitable to determine whether established constitutional safeguards against arbitrary state action will be upheld or eroded.

Precedent and Digital Power: How the Karnataka High Court’s X Corp Ruling Challenges India’s Free Speech Framework 

Introduction: A Judicial Crossroads for Digital Expression 

In a ruling that has sent ripples through India’s legal and digital landscapes, the Karnataka High Court’s September 2025 decision in X Corp v. Union of India has done more than just uphold government takedown powers—it has ignited a fundamental debate on judicial discipline and the fragility of online freedoms. By validating the government’s use of the Sahyog Portal to issue takedown orders under Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act, the court has not merely interpreted law; it has, arguably, recalibrated the balance between state authority and constitutional liberty.

This analysis delves into why this order is perceived as a significant departure from the Supreme Court’s landmark Shreya Singhal precedent, how it creates a parallel, less accountable censorship system, and what its implications are for the future of free speech in the world’s largest democracy. 

The Heart of the Conflict: Sahyog Portal vs. the Shreya Singhal Safeguards 

To understand the gravity of the Karnataka HC’s ruling, one must first appreciate the constitutional architecture established by the Supreme Court in its 2015 Shreya Singhal judgment. 

• The Shreya Singhal Standard: This seminal ruling did two key things. First, it struck down the draconian Section 66A of the IT Act for being vague and overbroad, protecting online discussion and advocacy from arbitrary state action. Second, while upholding the government’s content-blocking power under Section 69A, it did so by emphasizing its “narrowly drawn” nature with “several safeguards.” These safeguards, as per the Blocking Rules of 2009, include: 

• A reasoned written order from a designated high-ranking government official. 

• Review by a committee before a final blocking decision. 

• In many cases, an opportunity for the content originator or intermediary to be heard. 

The Supreme Court’s validation was explicitly contingent on these procedural safeguards, ensuring that censorship was not a covert, unilateral act but a measured, accountable process. 

• The Sahyog Portal Bypass: The Sahyog Portal, upheld by the Karnataka HC, operates under Section 79(3)(b) and the 2021 IT Rules. This creates a parallel takedown universe that circumvents the Shreya Singhal safeguards: 

• It allows multiple agencies, including state police forces, to issue takedown notices directly to intermediaries. 

• It operates without the requirement of a detailed, reasoned order or a committee review. 

• It provides no opportunity for a hearing for the user who created the content or, in many instances, for the intermediary to contest the order substantively. 

This is the core of the controversy: the government, through the Sahyog Portal, appears to be achieving through Section 79(3)(b) what it could only do under Section 69A with strict oversight. The Karnataka HC’s endorsement of this mechanism is seen by critics as sanctioning a “colourable exercise of power”—doing indirectly what cannot be done directly. 

Judicial Indiscipline? Misreading and Distinguishing Precedent 

A High Court is bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court. The Karnataka HC’s order is considered per incuriam (decided through ignorance or neglect of a binding statute or precedent) because it effectively read down Shreya Singhal without the authority to do so. 

1. The Misplaced Reliance on Subsequent Judgments: The High Court attempted to suggest a shift in judicial thought by citing three Supreme Court cases:

• Ajit Mohan (2022): Concerned with the powers of a legislative assembly to summon tech executives, this case had no bearing on the procedural safeguards for content takedown. 

• Just Rights for Children Alliance (2024): This dealt with the possession of child sexual abuse material, a specific, grievous offence. Using its general observations on intermediary liability to dilute the specific, constitutionally-mandated procedures for all speech laid out in Shreya Singhal is a classic case of misapplying a legal principle. 

• Ranveer Gautam Allahabadia (2025): Primarily about consolidating multiple FIRs, its passing reference to exploring regulations under Article 19(2) cannot be construed as an endorsement of a framework that bypasses essential safeguards. 

By weaving these unrelated threads together, the High Court created an “artificial impression of judicial divergence” where none exists, undermining the doctrine of precedent that ensures stability and predictability in law. 

2. The Flawed “American Doctrine” Red Herring: The Karnataka HC’s assertion that Shreya Singhal was “broadly based” on the U.S. Supreme Court’s Reno case and that American doctrines shouldn’t be a touchstone is a profound misreading. A scrutiny of the Shreya Singhal judgment reveals it was firmly anchored in a “catena of its own judgments” like Kedar Nath Singh and Ram Manohar Lohia. The reference to Reno was incidental, not foundational. This reasoning provides a thin veneer for disregarding a binding precedent that is deeply rooted in Indian constitutional jurisprudence.
3. The Isolation of Article 19 and the Silos Fallacy: The Court held that X Corp, as a foreign company, could not claim the protection of Article 19(1)(a) (free speech). While this legal point is debatable, the court erred by interpreting this article in a silo, ignoring the holistic nature of fundamental rights. The A.K. Gopalan-era approach of viewing fundamental rights as separate watertight compartments was rejected decades ago. Even if Article 19 is not directly applicable, Article 14 (the right to equality) always is. State action must be non-arbitrary and non-discriminatory. A secretive portal that allows for the takedown of content without due process is the very definition of arbitrariness and violates Article 14, a protection available to citizens and corporations alike.

The Chilling Effect and the Spectre of Unchecked Authority 

The practical consequences of this ruling are staggering. As argued by X Corp, the Sahyog Portal could empower “millions of police officers” across India to issue takedown orders. This creates several existential threats to free speech: 

• The Chilling Effect: When any content can be deemed “unlawful” by a low-level official through a non-transparent process, users and platforms will engage in severe self-censorship. Criticism of the government, dissent, and satirical content—the lifeblood of a deliberative democracy—will be the first casualties. 

• Lack of Expertise and Uniformity: A takedown mechanism dispersed among thousands of law enforcement agencies, without centralised legal oversight, guarantees inconsistent application and a high probability of error and abuse. 

• Contrast with the Bombay HC’s Stance: The Karnataka ruling stands in sharp contrast to the Bombay High Court’s September 2024 decision striking down the government’s “Fact Check Unit” (FCU). The Bombay HC held that the FCU rule violated natural justice (no hearing) and that the parent IT Act did not empower the creation of such a unit. The Karnataka HC overlooked these very principles in its analysis of the Sahyog Portal, creating a conflicting jurisprudence that only the Supreme Court can now resolve. 

Conclusion: An Inevitable Appeal and a Test for the Supreme Court 

The Karnataka High Court’s order in the X Corp case is more than a single legal verdict; it is a symptom of a broader tension between expanding state control over digital spaces and the constitutional imperative to protect free speech. By privileging executive convenience over procedural justice and by attempting to distinguish away a clear, binding precedent, the judgment exemplifies a concerning form of judicial indiscipline. 

The path forward is clear. An appeal to the Supreme Court is not just likely; it is essential for the coherence of India’s free speech jurisprudence. The Supreme Court now faces a critical test. It must decide whether to: 

• Reaffirm Shreya Singhal, striking down the Sahyog Portal mechanism as an unconstitutional bypass of established safeguards, or 

• Allow the dilution of its own precedent, potentially unleashing a decentralised and opaque censorship regime that would fundamentally alter the nature of public discourse in India. 

The core question is not whether the government has a right to regulate unlawful online content—it unquestionably does. The question is whether it must do so within the four walls of the Constitution and the procedural safeguards that the Supreme Court itself has declared essential. The future of India’s digital public square depends on the answer.