Of Centralised Power & Democratic Decay: The Urgent Case for Decentralising India’s Election Machinery 

Based on the article by M.G. Devasahayam, the central argument is that the Election Commission of India (ECI) has become a dangerously centralized and unaccountable institution, having “weaponised” India’s voting system through alleged practices like facilitating voter fraud, manipulating electoral rolls, and operating with opaque, authoritarian contempt for public accountability.

This crisis is rooted in a foundational flaw: the Constitution’s centralization of electoral power under Article 324, a departure from the original federal draft which envisioned separate state commissions. The author warns that this concentration of power, combined with a partisan appointment process and legal immunity, is fulfilling a Supreme Court prophecy that a biased ECI could cause political havoc, thereby threatening to turn India into an “electoral autocracy.”

The proposed solution is a constitutional decentralization that would empower existing State Election Commissions to conduct assembly elections, thereby creating a system of checks and balances that aligns with India’s federal structure and could restore integrity to the democratic process.

Of Centralised Power & Democratic Decay: The Urgent Case for Decentralising India’s Election Machinery 

The recent, sharp exchange between Rahul Gandhi, the Leader of the Opposition, and the Election Commission of India (ECI) over alleged bogus voters in a Bengaluru constituency was more than a political squabble. It was a symptom of a far deeper, systemic malady threatening the core of Indian democracy. The ECI’s response—a mix of what critic M.G. Devasahayam terms “passive-aggression, shaky legalese, and intimidation”—has ignited a long-simmering debate: has India’s election machinery, once a global gold standard, become a centralised, unaccountable leviathan intoxicated by its own power? 

The evidence, as presented by seasoned observers, points to a disturbing pattern. From allegations of spurious vote injections after polling hours to large-scale manipulation of electoral rolls and a steadfast refusal to cooperate with investigations, the ECI’s actions increasingly appear to be those of an institution that sees itself as answerable to no one. This trajectory was not entirely unforeseen. In a prophetic 1984 judgment (AC Jose vs Sivan Pillai), the Supreme Court voiced a chilling warning: if the Commission, armed with the “unlimited and arbitrary powers” of Article 324, were ever to be manned by individuals wedded to a particular ideology, they could “cause a political havoc or bring about a constitutional crisis.” 

Four decades later, many argue that prophecy is coming to pass. The abrupt, centrally-driven Special Intensive Revision of electoral rolls in Bihar, now reportedly being extended nationwide, only fuels these concerns. The problem, therefore, is not merely one of administrative lapses but of a foundational constitutional flaw—the radical centralisation of electoral power in a nation conceived as a “Union of States.” 

The Fatal Flaw in the Foundation: Ambedkar’s “Radical Change” 

The original constitutional blueprint, drafted by the Constituent Assembly, was inherently federal. Article 289 provided for separate Election Commissions for the Centre and the States. This design respected the federal spirit, granting states autonomy over their own legislative elections. It was a logical extension of the political diversity that defined India. 

However, in a last-minute reversal, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar proposed the centralised model we have today under Article 324. He called it a “radical change,” arguing for a single commission assisted by regional commissioners, independent of provincial governments. His intent was likely noble—to ensure uniformity and insulate the process from local political pressures at a time when the nation was in its infancy. Yet, as Devasahayam notes, little did he realise that this “radical change” would prove “very costly to the very survival of electoral democracy.” 

The law of unintended consequences has played out with a vengeance. By concentrating immense power in a single, three-member body appointed by the central executive, the system created a single point of potential failure—and control. When combined with a distorted appointment process and the virtual impunity granted by the Chief Election Commissioner and other Election Commissioners Act, 2023, the ECI has become, for all practical purposes, an “absolute power” in its domain. And as Lord Acton’s famous adage reminds us, “absolute power corrupts absolutely.” 

The Symptomology of a Weaponised System 

The centralisation of power is not an abstract concern; it manifests in tangible, corrosive ways: 

• The Hermetically Sealed Fortress: Since around 2018, Delhi’s Nirvachan Sadan, the ECI headquarters, has increasingly functioned as a “secret society,” opaque and unresponsive. Representations from political parties, civil society, and the public are often met with “authoritarian contempt.” This isolation breeds suspicion and erodes public trust, the very currency of a credible election. 

• The Transparency Deficit: The Commission’s relationship with the Right to Information (RTI) Act is a study in hypocrisy. While the ECI demands exhaustive documentation from citizens to prove their identity and voting rights, it refuses to subject itself to the same standard of transparency. The most shocking example cited is an RTI reply where the ECI claimed it had “no information” about the Returning Officers who conducted the very Lok Sabha elections it supervised. If true, this is not merely bureaucratic failure; it is an abdication of basic accountability. 

• The Unmanageable Behemoth: The scale of Indian elections is often celebrated, but it has also become a vulnerability. With nearly a billion voters, over a million polling stations, and 15 million polling officials, the system is so massive that conducting a national election now requires seven phases. This prolonged process stretches security and administrative resources thin, creating windows for manipulation and compromising the sanctity of a simultaneous, collective democratic expression. 

The Federal Antidote: A Return to the Original Spirit 

The solution to this democratic decay lies in a return to the original federal spirit of the Constitution. Decentralisation is not just an administrative preference; it is a democratic necessity. The blueprint for this reform already exists within our constitutional framework, successfully operating for over three decades: the State Election Commissions (SECs). 

Established through the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments, SECs are autonomous constitutional bodies responsible for administering elections to Panchayats and Municipalities. Their structure is a mirror of the ECI: 

• The State Election Commissioner is appointed by the Governor for a fixed, secure tenure of five years. 

• They can only be removed through the same rigorous process as a High Court judge, ensuring independence. 

• They hold the powers of “superintendence, direction and control” over local body elections, including delimitation, enforcing the Model Code of Conduct, and registering political parties. 

In essence, India already has 28 fully functional, independent election management bodies at the state level. They have proven their capability and integrity in conducting the complex, multi-tiered elections to India’s third tier of governance. The logical next step is to empower them to conduct elections to the State Legislative Assemblies. 

A Practical Blueprint for Democratic Renewal 

Decentralising the election machinery would involve a constitutional amendment to effectively revert to the spirit of the original Article 289. This would entail: 

• The ECI’s Refined Role: The central Election Commission would retain its critical mandate over elections to the Parliament and the offices of President and Vice-President. This ensures national standards and coordination on issues like national voter rolls. 

• The SECs’ Enhanced Mandate: Each State Election Commission would be empowered to conduct elections to its respective State Legislative Assembly. This would make the election process more responsive to local realities, reduce the administrative burden on a single central body, and create multiple, independent pillars of electoral integrity. 

This reform would achieve several crucial objectives: 

• Check and Balance: It would dismantle the current system of a single, overpowered centre of electoral control. A mistake or malfeasance in one state would not necessarily imperil the integrity of elections nationwide. 

• Enhanced Accountability: SECs are physically and politically closer to the electorate they serve. This proximity fosters greater accountability and responsiveness to local concerns, be they about voter lists, polling station management, or candidate conduct. 

• Manageable Scale: By breaking down the monolithic task of national elections into smaller, state-level processes, the system becomes more agile, transparent, and less prone to the “weaponisation” that critics fear. 

Conclusion: Saving Democracy from Electoral Autocracy 

The confrontation between the LoP and the ECI is not the cause for alarm; it is the alarm. It signals that India stands at a precipice, fast morphing into what political scientists have termed an ‘electoral autocracy’—a system where the rituals of elections remain, but the free and fair soul of the process has been extinguished. 

The centralisation of electoral power is a ticking time bomb. Decentralising this machinery is no longer a matter of administrative efficiency; it is an urgent democratic imperative. By empowering State Election Commissions and returning to the federal balance envisioned by the founding fathers, India can fortify its democratic foundations. It is a choice between preserving a centralised fortress of unaccountable power or nurturing a distributed, resilient, and truly democratic ecosystem of elections. The future of the world’s largest democracy may well depend on which path we choose.