Bridging the Power Gap: Why the Safran Engine Deal is India’s Stepping Stone, Not the Destination
The imminent deal with France’s Safran to co-develop a 110kN engine for India’s AMCA fighter jet is a crucial strategic stopgap that will bypass delays and establish domestic production, but it must not be mistaken for the final goal of self-reliance.
This partnership, while offering valuable production knowledge and strategic autonomy over maintenance, leaves critical design and core technology gaps, as evidenced by the chronic underfunding and ultimate shelving of the indigenous Kaveri engine program, which received a meager $230 million compared to the billions spent by other global powers.
To achieve true aatmanirbharta, India must leverage the Safran deal as a targeted apprenticeship to fill ecosystem voids, while concurrently launching a robustly funded “Kaveri 2.0” national mission to build the indigenous R&D and testing infrastructure required for future, wholly independent aero engine designs.

Bridging the Power Gap: Why the Safran Engine Deal is India’s Stepping Stone, Not the Destination
When Prime Minister Narendra Modi stood at the Red Fort and championed the cause of indigenous aero engine manufacturing, he wasn’t just announcing a policy; he was acknowledging a decades-old vulnerability in India’s strategic autonomy. The heart of a modern fighter jet—its engine—has been a chronic weak spot, a piece of imported technology that has, for too long, dictated the pace of our aerospace ambitions.
The imminent deal with French firm Safran to co-develop a 110 kN thrust engine for the fifth-generation AMCA fighter is a monumental leap forward. But to see it as the final destination would be a catastrophic misreading of its purpose. It is, instead, a critical bridge India must cross to finally achieve true self-reliance.
The Ghost in the Machine: The Legacy of the Kaveri Engine
To understand the significance of the Safran deal, one must first pay respects to its troubled predecessor: the Kaveri engine. Launched in 1989 with the ambitious goal of powering the Tejas LCA, the Kaveri programme was India’s bold first step into the rarefied club of aero engine producers. Its story is not one of simple failure, but a masterclass in how not to fund and manage a strategic, deep-tech project.
The Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) was tasked with a Herculean endeavour. Aero engines are often described as the pinnacle of mechanical engineering, operating at temperatures exceeding the melting point of their own metal components, with tolerances finer than a human hair. Despite this, the initial funding sanctioned was a paltry Rs 382 crore—a figure that reflected a profound underestimation of the challenge. Over three decades, the project consumed Rs 2,037 crore before being effectively shelved.
The Funding Fallacy: A Global Perspective
Critics often point to this cost overrun as evidence of failure. However, this narrative collapses under a global comparison. Consider these figures:
- EJ200 (Eurofighter): ~$1.6 billion (1985-1995)
- F135 (F-35 Lightning II): ~$6.7 billion
- Chinese Aero Engine Programs: Cumulative investments estimated at a staggering $42 billion.
In this context, India’s total investment of approximately $230 million over 32 years wasn’t an overrun; it was a starvation diet. It was enough to build a prototype but nowhere near sufficient to create an ecosystem. The real failure was not GTRE’s engineering, but the systemic inability to commit the requisite resources for a project of this scale and complexity.
The death knell for Kaveri was sounded with two decisions: the import of the GE-404 engine for the Tejas in 2007, and the formal delinking of the Kaveri from the LCA in 2008. This removed the programme’s urgency and its primary customer, leading to a gradual decline in momentum and will.
The Safran Deal: Strategic Stopgap or Game-Changer?
The proposed co-development with Safran, likely based on the core of their proven M88 engine, is a pragmatic and necessary pivot. It directly addresses the most pressing need: powering the AMCA on time. Unlike a direct purchase, co-development offers profound advantages:
- “Build in India” with Strategic Autonomy: India will not just be assembling kits. The deal is structured for production on Indian soil, granting the Indian Air Force control over maintenance, overhaul, and supply chains. This bypasses the political risks and delays often associated with fully imported defense hardware.
- Knowledge Transfer: Indian engineers from DRDO and HAL will work shoulder-to-shoulder with Safran’s experts. This is an invaluable opportunity to learn the art of integrating complex systems, mastering certification processes, and understanding the nuances of scaling up production.
- Filling the Immediate Capability Gap: It ensures the AMCA project is not held hostage to engine availability, allowing the airframe and other systems to progress on schedule.
However, the deal has inherent limitations. Safran will understandably protect its “crown jewel” intellectual property—the fundamental design philosophies, material science secrets, and proprietary simulation codes that make the M88 core so efficient. Co-development from an existing platform means we are learning to perfect and adapt, not to create from a blank slate. This leaves critical knowledge gaps that would prevent India from designing a brand-new, cutting-edge engine on its own in the future.
The Path to True Aatmanirbharta: A Three-Pronged Strategy
To ensure the Safran deal becomes a true catalyst for self-reliance and not just a sophisticated dependency, India must pursue a concurrent, aggressive three-pronged strategy.
- Aggressively Leverage the Safran Partnership: The mandate for Indian teams should be clear: this is not just a project to deliver an engine, but a decades-long apprenticeship. We must go beyond the contractual obligations to absorb the why behind every design choice, every material selection, and every test protocol. The goal should be to build institutional knowledge that remains long after the Safran engineers have left.
- Invest Ruthlessly in the Ecosystem: The Kaveri programme highlighted India’s crippling infrastructure gaps, most notably the lack of a high-altitude test bed (HTB) and a flying test bed (FTB). An engine cannot be certified without simulating the thin, freezing air of high altitudes. Building these facilities is non-negotiable and must be treated as a national priority. The investment here will pay dividends for decades, serving not just military projects but also the burgeoning civil aviation and space sectors.
- Launch ‘Kaveri 2.0’ – The National Mission for Aero Engines: This is the most critical step. The Safran deal must buy the time and space for GTRE and DRDO to start afresh. We cannot let the Kaveri experience breed a permanent sense of defeat. The government must launch a fully-funded, time-bound national mission with a clear mandate.
This “Kaveri 2.0” should not be about reviving the old engine. It should be a new programme that:
- Incorporates Lessons Learned: It must use the vast data and experience from the original Kaveri, including its non-afterburning variants for UAVs.
- Embraces New Technologies: It should focus on next-generation technologies like adaptive cycle engines, ceramic matrix composites, and additive manufacturing (3D printing) for complex components.
- Has a Clear, Dual-Use Focus: While the immediate goal may be a military engine, the technology can spin off to develop engines for regional transport aircraft, helicopters, and even marine gas turbines for the Navy.
Conclusion: The Power to Dream
Prime Minister Modi’s vision from the Red Fort is not just about an engine; it is about the power to dream without constraints. A nation that cannot power its own defense platforms is forever tethered to the geopolitical whims of its suppliers.
The Safran deal is a masterstroke of realpolitik—it secures India’s immediate future. But it must be viewed as the means to an end, not the end itself. By strategically leveraging this partnership to fill our gaps, building the ecosystem we so desperately need, and summoning the political will to launch a sustained, well-funded indigenous programme, we can ensure that the AMCA is powered by a foreign heart only in its first generation.
The ultimate goal must be that its successor, and all future aircraft that bear the Indian flag, are powered by a heart made in India, for India. The journey to true self-reliance begins not by closing the chapter on Kaveri, but by writing its successor with the ink of hard-won experience and unwavering national resolve.
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