Between Principle and Pragmatism: Pakistan’s High-Stakes Gamble on the Gaza Stabilization Force 

Pakistan’s potential participation in the Gaza International Stabilisation Force represents a precarious diplomatic tightrope, where the government must balance its principled, long-standing support for Palestinian statehood against the pragmatic allure of enhanced geopolitical influence and economic incentives from the U.S. and Gulf allies; however, any deployment risks significant domestic backlash due to the profound sensitivity of the Palestine issue, the operational necessity of coordinating with Israeli forces, and the unresolved ambiguities in the force’s mandate concerning disarming Hamas, leaving Islamabad to navigate a decision that could either cement its role as a regional security stabilizer or ignite a firestorm of public outrage.

Between Principle and Pragmatism: Pakistan’s High-Stakes Gamble on the Gaza Stabilization Force 

1. A Diplomatic Tightrope: Pakistan’s Calculated Support

Pakistan’s “yes” vote for UNSC Resolution 2803 was a masterclass in diplomatic balancing. While supporting the resolution, Pakistan’s envoy, Asim Iftikhar Ahmed, pointedly expressed that “some critical suggestions” from Islamabad were omitted . This public critique, even while voting in favor, signals a government acutely aware of domestic sentiment. The resolution was criticized by several members, including China, for being “vague and unclear” on critical details like the mandate of the ISF and the powers of the Board of Peace (BoP) . By echoing these concerns, Pakistan positions itself as a cautious partner, not a blind follower. 

This balancing act is driven by a stark realization articulated by former Foreign Secretary Salman Bashir: the U.S.-backed plan, despite its flaws, is seen in many capitals as the “best option that we have” to end the bloodshed . Pakistan’s leadership appears to be making a pragmatic calculation that engaging with an imperfect peace process is preferable to a return to open conflict, a sentiment summed up by the old adage, “the perfect is the enemy of the good,” which was echoed during the Council’s deliberations . 

2. The Domestic Third Rail: Public Sentiment on Palestine

The single greatest risk for Islamabad is a volcanic domestic backlash. The issue of Palestine is a deeply emotional and foundational element of Pakistani foreign policy. The country does not recognize Israel, a principle enshrined in its official passports . 

• The Hamas Factor: The resolution mandates the “demilitarisation” of Gaza and the **”permanent decommissioning of weapons from non-state armed groups”**—a direct demand for Hamas to disarm . Hamas has already rejected the resolution, calling it an attempt to impose “foreign guardianship” . If Pakistani troops were ever placed in a position where they had to confront or disarm Hamas militants, the domestic political fallout would be severe. Experts warn that the ISF could quickly be seen as “a party to the conflict,” a risk Russia highlighted in its abstention . 

• The Israeli Coordination Problem: Perhaps the most sensitive issue is any form of coordination with Israeli forces. Analyst Kamran Bokhari states bluntly that there is “no way Pakistan or any other participating nation can avoid coordinating with Israel” . However, retired General Muhammad Saeed offers a potential workaround, suggesting that countries with existing ties to Israel could handle direct liaison, insulating Pakistani troops . Despite this, retired General Omar Mahmood Hayat warns that any perceived operational tie to Israel “will ignite domestic backlash and erode public trust,” framing it as both a moral and strategic contradiction . 

3. The Allure of Influence: Strategic and Economic Incentives

Despite the risks, powerful incentives are pulling Pakistan toward participation. The nation is actively recalibrating its foreign policy to enhance its global standing and secure its economic future . 

• Elevated Geopolitical Stature: Pakistan is being courted as a key regional player. Its recent Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement with Saudi Arabia—which declares an attack on one is an attack on the other—formalizes a major security partnership . Furthermore, U.S. President Donald Trump’s very public praise for Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir, whom he called “my favourite field marshal” and a “great fighter,” signals a notable warming in relations . Contributing to the ISF is a opportunity to cement this rising influence and be seen as a core security provider in the Muslim world. 

• Economic and Diplomatic Capital: Pakistan faces significant economic challenges. Its participation in a major international initiative backed by the U.S. and wealthy Gulf allies could be leveraged to secure “goodwill,” investment, and financial support . This is not merely speculation; during recent visits to Washington, Pakistani leaders actively “promoted potential investment opportunities” . Participation in the ISF is a tangible way to demonstrate value to these partners. 

The following table summarizes the core conditions Pakistan has likely set for its involvement and the corresponding risks it must manage: 

4. The Operational Minefield: Legal and Practical Ambiguities

Beyond public sentiment, the mission itself is fraught with operational uncertainties. The UN resolution is a framework, not a detailed plan. Key questions remain unanswered: 

• Rules of Engagement: The most critical unknown is what the ISF is authorized to do. Is it a classic peacekeeping force that only responds when fired upon, or is it a “peace-enforcement” mission with a proactive combat mandate to disarm militants ? This distinction is crucial for any troop-contributing country. 

• The Governance Vacuum: The resolution establishes a BoP, chaired by Donald Trump, with broad transitional authority . However, the role of the Palestinian Authority (PA) is sidelined, and the plan is to eventually hand over to a “reformed” PA . This creates a political vacuum that the ISF would have to police, potentially pitting it against various Palestinian factions. 

5. The Road Ahead: A Decision of National Consequence

The Pakistani government is proceeding with extreme caution. Officially, it states that a final decision will be made “after consultation at the highest level” and will involve parliament . Defence Minister Khawaja Asif has called potential participation a “matter of pride,” but immediately clarified the government would follow a consultative process . 

Pakistan’s extensive experience as a top contributor to UN peacekeeping missions bolsters its credentials but doesn’t neutralize the unique political toxicity of this deployment . The ultimate choice is a defining one. It pits the allure of enhanced geopolitical influence and economic dividends against the formidable risk of triggering a firestorm of public outrage and being entangled in an open-ended, volatile conflict. 

To join the ISF without backlash, Pakistan would need ironclad guarantees on the political pathway for Palestinians, a crystal-clear and benign mandate for its troops, and a firm buffer against any direct dealings with Israel. Whether such conditions can be met in the messy reality of Gaza’s post-war landscape remains the central, and still unanswerable, question.