A New Current in South Asian Politics: Why Bangladesh’s UN Water Gambit Puts India on the Defensive 

Bangladesh’s landmark accession to the UN Water Convention, while driven by its profound vulnerability as a downstream nation facing existential water crises from upstream dams and climate change, has strategically unsettled its powerful neighbor, India. By adopting this multilateral framework, Bangladesh challenges India’s long-standing preference for bilateral water agreements, which Dhaka views as ineffective and inequitable, particularly regarding disputes over rivers like the Teesta and the looming renewal of the Ganges Treaty.

This move creates a ripple effect by not only strengthening Bangladesh’s legal standing in future negotiations but also potentially encouraging other South Asian nations to follow suit and, most alarmingly for New Delhi, aligning with China’s strategic interests, thereby forcing India to choose between clinging to an outdated hydro-political hegemony or embracing a new, cooperative regional water governance model.

A New Current in South Asian Politics: Why Bangladesh’s UN Water Gambit Puts India on the Defensive 

In the intricate tapestry of South Asian geopolitics, water is more than a resource; it’s a historical currency, a source of life, and a potential weapon. For decades, the region’s hydraulic relations have been governed by a delicate, and often tense, system of bilateral treaties. But a seismic shift is underway. In 2025, Bangladesh made a strategic move that is sending ripples across the Himalayas: it became the first South Asian nation to accede to the United Nations Water Convention. 

On the surface, this is a story of a nation seeking legal recourse for its water security. But dig deeper, and it reveals a high-stakes geopolitical drama, pitting a desperate downstream nation against its powerful upstream neighbor, India, with an increasingly assertive China watching from the sidelines. This isn’t just about water rights; it’s a fundamental challenge to the regional balance of power. 

The Plight of the Delta: Why Bangladesh Felt Compelled to Act 

To understand Bangladesh’s move, one must first appreciate its profound vulnerability. Nestled in the world’s largest river delta, Bangladesh is a nation shaped and sustained by water. Yet, this blessing is a double-edged sword. 

• Geographic Precariousness: A staggering 93% of the watershed area of the three great rivers that sustain it—the Ganges, Brahmaputra, and Meghna—lies outside its borders. Bangladesh is at the mercy of decisions made in New Delhi and Beijing. 

• The Strangulation of Rivers: A recent government report delivered a stark warning: 81 of the country’s 1,415 rivers have either vanished or are on the brink of extinction. This is not a natural death. It’s the result of upstream dams, barrages, and diversion projects that choke the flow before it can reach the Bangladeshi floodplains. 

• A Perfect Storm of Crises: The nation is caught in a pincer movement of climate change and human intervention. Rising sea levels are pushing saltwater into fertile agricultural lands, while reduced river flows from upstream prevent the flushing out of this salinity. Simultaneously, the changing Himalayan hydrology, driven by a warming planet, makes glacial melt and monsoon patterns increasingly unpredictable, leading to cycles of devastating floods and crippling droughts. 

For Bangladesh, water is not an abstract policy issue; it is an existential one. The 2019 High Court ruling granting rivers legal personhood status was a powerful, symbolic act of domestic desperation. Accession to the UN Water Convention is the logical, international extension of that same fight for survival. 

The Elephant in the Room: India’s Hydro-Hegemony and Its Fraying Edges 

India’s reaction to Bangladesh’s move has been a studied silence, but the tension is palpable. For decades, India has been the regional hydro-hegemon, preferring to negotiate water disputes through bilateral channels where its size and economic clout give it a natural advantage. The 1996 Ganges Water Sharing Treaty with Bangladesh and the Indus Waters Treaty with Pakistan are monuments to this approach. 

However, this bilateral framework is cracking under 21st-century pressures. 

• The Teesta Stalemate: The long-standing dispute over the Teesta River is a festering wound in India-Bangladesh relations. Bangladesh has long sought an equitable sharing agreement, but Indian domestic politics, particularly the opposition from the state of West Bengal, has repeatedly scuttled a deal. For Dhaka, this is a prime example of the limitations and frustrations of bilateralism. 

• Unilateral Indian Projects: Bangladesh has consistently raised alarms over Indian dam projects like the Tipaimukh on the Barak River, fearing catastrophic environmental and social consequences downstream. Similarly, India’s ambitious National River Linking Project, which aims to connect 30 rivers, is viewed with deep suspicion in Dhaka as a potential death knell for its water supply. 

• The Looming Ganges Treaty Renewal: The 1996 treaty is up for renewal in 2026, and the shadow of the UN Convention now looms large over these negotiations. New Delhi fears that Dhaka, armed with the convention’s principles of “equitable and reasonable use” and the “obligation not to cause significant harm,” will demand a significantly revised treaty that could compel India to release more water, especially during the critical dry season. This would directly impact water-stressed regions in eastern India, turning a diplomatic issue into a domestic political crisis. 

The Ripple Effect: Multilateralism, China, and a Shifting Regional Order 

Bangladesh’s accession is not merely a bilateral tweak; it’s a potential catalyst for a regional paradigm shift. 

The Precedent for Nepal and Bhutan: Bangladesh has broken the South Asian taboo on multilateral water governance. Other smaller riparian states like Nepal and Bhutan, which also share complex water relations with India, will be watching closely. If Bangladesh is seen to successfully leverage the convention to secure a better deal, it could inspire a wave of accessions, fundamentally challenging India’s preferred mode of operation. 

The China Factor: This is the most strategically sensitive ripple of all. Just a day before signing the Water Convention, Bangladesh joined China and Pakistan—two of India’s primary strategic rivals—in announcing a new trilateral cooperation on economy, climate, and social development. While ostensibly separate, the timing is conspicuous. 

China’s own mega-hydro ambitions, exemplified by the newly announced Motuo Dam on the Yarlung Tsangpo (which becomes the Brahmaputra in India), directly threaten both India and Bangladesh. By engaging with China on water and climate, Bangladesh is subtly signaling that it is exploring all available options to secure its future. For India, the nightmare scenario is a coordinated, China-backed, multilateral water diplomacy bloc on its borders, using a UN-sanctioned legal instrument to challenge its water sovereignty. 

Navigating the Currents: The Strategic Crossroads for India 

Bangladesh’s move has forced a strategic dilemma upon New Delhi. Its choice will define South Asian hydro-politics for a generation. 

Option 1: Dig In and Defend Bilateralism. India could refuse to engage with the convention, reinforcing its bilateral stance. This might work in the short term, but it would come at a significant cost. It would paint India as an obstructive regional bully, push Bangladesh further into China’s strategic embrace, and erode India’s soft power and claims to global leadership. In an era of climate crisis, appearing intransigent on a vital resource like water is a poor long-term strategy. 

Option 2: Embrace the New Current. The more visionary, albeit riskier, path would be for India to reconsider its own position. By eventually acceding to the convention itself, India could shift from being a target of its provisions to an architect of their implementation. This would allow New Delhi to: 

• Level the Playing Field with China: As an upper riparian to Bangladesh but a lower riparian to China on the Brahmaputra, the convention could provide India with a powerful legal and diplomatic tool to hold Beijing accountable for its upstream activities. 

• Shape Regional Norms: Instead of resisting multilateralism, India could lead it, fostering a genuinely cooperative framework for the entire Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin that acknowledges the realities of climate change. 

• Rebuild Trust: A proactive, cooperative approach on water would be the strongest possible antidote to China’s influence in South Asia, strengthening ties with Bangladesh and other neighbors based on mutual benefit rather than reluctant compromise. 

Conclusion: Beyond a Zero-Sum Game 

The waters flowing into Bangladesh are indeed shrinking, but the geopolitical space around them is expanding. Bangladesh’s decision to join the UN Water Convention is a calculated move born of necessity, a bid to internationalize a local crisis that it can no longer solve alone. 

The initial “ripple effect” may indeed cause problems with India, testing a relationship built on geography and fraught with history. However, it also presents a rare opportunity. It forces a conversation that the region can no longer afford to postpone. In a climate-stressed world, the zero-sum game of 20th-century water politics is a path to collective ruin. The true test of regional leadership will be whether India and Bangladesh can navigate these turbulent waters to find a new, multilateral course—one that ensures that the rivers that have historically divided them can become a conduit for a more stable, cooperative future.