India’s Constitutional Tightrope: Centre Challenges Supreme Court on Gubernatorial Powers 

India’s Centre has issued a forceful warning to the Supreme Court, arguing that its imposition of a 3-month deadline for Governors and the President to act on state bills constitutes dangerous judicial overreach. Solicitor General Tushar Mehta asserted that gubernatorial assent is a “high prerogative, plenary, non-justiciable power” exclusively vested in the executive by the Constitution. The Centre contends Governors embody national democratic will within states and their deliberative functions cannot be subjected to judicially managed timelines without violating the separation of powers – a fundamental feature of India’s basic constitutional structure.

Imposing such deadlines, it argues, risks destabilizing inter-institutional balance and effectively establishes judicial supremacy. The government emphasized that constitutional silence on timelines is deliberate, and perceived delays must be resolved through political accountability – not court-ordered “deemed assent” – to avoid usurping powers the Constitution never granted the judiciary. This clash represents a pivotal moment for defining the boundaries of India’s democratic institutions.

India’s Constitutional Tightrope: Centre Challenges Supreme Court on Gubernatorial Powers 

The Indian government has issued a stark constitutional warning to the Supreme Court, arguing that its attempt to impose deadlines on Governors and the President for acting on state bills constitutes dangerous judicial overreach that threatens the delicate balance of power enshrined in the Constitution. 

The Heart of the Conflict: At the center of this high-stakes debate is the Supreme Court’s April ruling. A two-judge bench mandated that: 

• Governors must act on bills passed by state legislatures within a “reasonable time,” interpreted as three months. 

• The President, upon a Governor reserving a bill for consideration, must also decide within three months. 

This decision prompted President Droupadi Murmu to refer 14 critical constitutional questions to a larger five-judge bench in May, questioning the very validity of such judicially imposed timelines. 

The Centre’s Forceful Rebuttal: In written submissions to the five-judge bench, Solicitor General Tushar Mehta articulated the Centre’s core objections with unprecedented clarity: 

Sacrosanct Separation of Powers: The Centre emphasized that while “checks and balances” exist, certain core functions of each branch – executive, legislature, judiciary – remain inviolable. The power of Governors and the President regarding bills falls squarely within this exclusive “zone.” 

• “The alleged failure, inaction or error of one organ does not and cannot authorise another organ to assume powers that the Constitution has not vested in it.” 

• “If any organ is permitted to arrogate to itself the functions of another… the consequence would be a constitutional disorder not envisaged by (Constitution) framers.” 

Assent: A “High Prerogative, Plenary, Non-Justiciable Power”: This phrase is central to the Centre’s argument. Mehta argued that gubernatorial/presidential assent is: 

• Unique (sui generis): Blending executive position with a legislative function (giving assent makes the bill law). 

• Beyond Judicial Review: Lacks “judicially manageable standards.” The complex political, legal, and national interest considerations involved cannot be meaningfully adjudicated by courts. 

• Constitutionally Flexible: The deliberate absence of timelines in Articles 200 (Governor’s options on state bills) and 201 (President’s consideration of reserved bills) signifies a design choice for flexibility, which courts cannot override. 

Governors: Representing the Nation, Not Just the Centre: Countering the perception of Governors as central agents, the Centre asserted: 

• “Governors are not to be treated as alien/ foreigner… They represent national interest and national democratic will in the States.” 

• They are “representations of democratic will,” legitimized through appointment by elected representatives, not just direct elections. 

Dangers of “Deemed Assent” and Judicial Supremacy: The Centre warned that imposing deadlines leading to “deemed assent” would: 

• “Destabilise the constitutional balance between (the) organs of State.” 

• “Upset the constitutional balance of powers… (and) convert the Indian Constitution into one which postulates supremacy of judiciary.” 

• Violate the Basic Structure doctrine established in the landmark Kesavananda Bharati case. 

Article 142 is Not a “Super Power”: The Centre stressed that even the Supreme Court’s extraordinary power under Article 142 (to pass any order necessary for “complete justice”) “cannot override the constitutional provisions or run contrary to them.” It cannot be used to create new constitutional procedures like deemed assent. 

Democracy Offers Other Remedies: The Centre argued that perceived gubernatorial delays are political-constitutional issues best resolved through: 

• Electoral accountability. 

• Legislative oversight. 

• Executive responsibility. 

• Established reference/consultative processes between branches. 

• “Certain political questions may have only democratic remedies.” 

Why This Matters Beyond Legal Jargon: 

This clash isn’t merely procedural; it strikes at the heart of India’s democratic functioning: 

• State Autonomy vs. National Oversight: How much time can a Governor (representing national interests) legitimately take to scrutinize state legislation? When does legitimate review become obstructive? 

• Judicial Activism vs. Restraint: Where is the line between the judiciary upholding constitutional morality and infringing on the legitimate domain of other branches? 

• Governance Paralysis: Indefinite delays do stall governance and policy implementation, impacting citizens. Yet, is a judicial-imposed timeline the right solution? 

• Constitutional Evolution: Does the Constitution’s silence on timelines imply unlimited discretion, or does the “reasonable time” principle inherent in good governance apply? How should constitutional silences be interpreted? 

The Path Ahead: 

The five-judge bench faces a monumental task: balancing the need for efficient governance against the fundamental constitutional principle of separation of powers. The Centre’s arguments present a formidable challenge to judicial intervention in this specific domain, framing it as a necessary bulwark against “constitutional disorder.” The Court’s eventual ruling will profoundly shape the relationship between Governors, States, the Centre, and the Judiciary itself, defining the practical boundaries of India’s constitutional framework for years to come. The core question remains: Who ultimately decides the clock?